After the World War II, a tense struggle took place in Czechoslovakia between democratic and communist political forces. It ended with the Communists’ victory in February 1948. The article is devoted to the perception of these process by the US Ambassador in Prague, L. Steinhardt. Exploring his letters, messages and speeches, the author analyzes Steinhardt’s views and political stereotypes, attitude to the Czechoslovak communists and their opponents, to their tactics. He also pays attention to ambassador’s perception of the February crisis of 1948 and its results, his characteristics of Czechoslovak leading political figures. The article is based on the US State Department documents and Steinhardt’s personal archive. The archive’s materials demonstrate that Steingardt perceived the Communists rise to power in Czechoslovakia as a major defeat, a defeat in the battle for democracy, a loss of this country for the West. Unable to predict the imminent onset of such outcome, he preferred to blame the Czechoslovak population’s indecisiveness and the Washington ineffective Foreign Policy for such event. The article substantiates that such perception, which did not allow alternatives and compromises, was typical for representatives of the US diplomatic and political circles in the second half of the 1940s and contributed to the escalation of the Cold War.